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Abstract 
Despite extensive global efforts, the number of individuals across the globe whose 
survival relies on the ability of international humanitarian aid organizations to provide lifesaving 
goods and services remains overwhelming, and donations abroad are lackluster. This study seeks 
to examine the role of distance in pro-social judgments and decisions. We hypothesize that 
increases in both objective and psychological distance will be associated with decreases in 
participants’ perceptions of others’ moral obligation to natural disaster victims. Additionally, we 
hypothesize that at greater distances these relationships will be weaker than when at smaller 
distances. Support was found for these hypotheses, suggesting psychological distance may have 
a numbing effect on pro-social judgments and decisions. Future research should continue to 
examine the extent of and capacity for psychological distance to numb individuals’ willingness 
to help those abroad, specifically across various cultures and through manipulation tasks. We 
hope that one day, the application of this and future findings will influence the manner in which 
charitable organizations solicit support for their efforts abroad. 
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Numbingly distant: The role of psychological distance in judgments of moral obligation to 
natural disaster victims 
Despite an impressive global push to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, The 
Millennium Development Goals Report 2013 found that 1.2 billion people are still living on less 
than $1.25 a day and one in eight people still go to bed hungry (UN Secretary-General, 2013).  
The number of individuals across the globe whose survival relies on the ability of international 
humanitarian aid organizations to provide lifesaving goods and services remains overwhelming. 
These organizations, many of which are non-profits, depend heavily on monetary donations to 
efficiently distribute quality aid. The most important contributors are individuals, whose 
donations comprise 72% of all contributions to aid organizations (Giving USA, 2013). However, 
only 6% of the $227 billion Americans donated in 2012 went to international affairs (Giving 
USA, 2013).  Understanding how psychology can help inform charitable organizations regarding 
the processes involved in individuals’ donation decisions is of personal interest, as I believe it is 
important these organizations develop more effective solicitations for support.   
Many factors influence donor behavior, such as emotion, and moral obligation, or the 
belief that certain duties or acts are rightly owed in order to help others (Cheung & Chan, 200; 
Theogensen, 1996; Keller et al., 2005). In fact, research has found moral obligation to be a 
significant predictor of an individuals’ intent to donate (Cheung & Chan, 2000). The question 
then becomes, what drives judgments of moral obligation? Research has found that both 
objective distance and psychological distance play important roles in donation decisions, and in 
ways which present theoretical overlap with judgments of moral obligation (Van Boven et al. 
2010; Williams, Stein & Galguera, in press). A brief review of each of these areas of research 
serves as important groundwork for understanding the theoretical linkages between these 
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variables. This groundwork leads to the present study, seeking to better understand how 
individuals perceive distance, and how these perceptions impact judgment and decisions related 
to moral obligation. 
Moral obligation and the role of affect 
First, it is important to understand which factors promote helping behavior. Philosopher 
and Nobel Peace Prize winner Albert Schweitzer once said, “The purpose of human life is to 
serve and to show compassion and the will to help others.”  Indeed many philosophers and 
psychologists alike agree upon the notion of moral obligation, or an individual’s belief that 
certain duties or acts are rightfully owed in order to help others (Cheung & Chan, 2000; 
Thogensen, 1996; Keller et al., 2005).  Overall, it is clear moral obligation is particularly 
important in understanding helping behavior.  
Research performed by Cheung & Chan (2000) sought to examine the significance of 
moral obligation in predicting charitable donations. In a telephone survey of Hong Kong 
residents, the researchers found that responses to their moral obligation scale (adapted from Beck 
& Ajzen, 1991) significantly predicted individuals’ intention to donate to a charitable 
organization within the year (Cheung & Chan, 2000). This study highlights the importance of 
moral obligation in donation decisions. 
In addition to moral obligation, previous research in the field of psychology has well 
established the importance of emotion in promoting pro-social behavior (Barrett & Salovey, 
2002; Clark & Fiske, 1982; Forgas, 2000; Le Doux, 1996). Affect conveys meaning upon 
information that is necessary for judgment and decision making processes (Loewenstein, Weber, 
Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). As Batson (1990) put it, 
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“considerable research suggests that we are more likely to help someone in need when we ‘feel 
for’ that person.”  
Indeed, many charity organizations’ solicitations heavily rely on generating sympathy, 
the emotional response stemming from the comprehension of another’s condition that results in 
feelings of sorrow and concern for another, in hopes of obtaining more donations (Small & 
Lowenstein, 2003; Eisenberg et al., 1994).  In support of this notion, Kogut and Ritov (2011) 
found a very strong connection between the aversive arousal caused by perceiving the distress of 
a person in need and ones decision to help, such that individuals’ reported ratings of distress 
(feeling worried, upset or sad) significantly predicted willingness to contribute. 
Psychic numbing 
It is important to note that not all factors positively influence donation decisions. Some 
psychological processes actually lead to scope insensitivity, which is when an individual’s 
donation decisions are uninfluenced by objective severity, deadliness or suffering (Huber, Van 
Boven, McGraw, Johnson-Graham, 2011; Kogut & Ritov, 2005); the individual becomes numb.  
Given the role of emotion in helping behavior, one could make the argument that individuals 
would consider highly affect-laden scenarios such as massive suffering and loss of life as 
disproportionately more serious due to the threat they pose to the social fabric and viability of a 
community (Slovic, 2007). However, when the plight of “the one” becomes “one of many” 
people become numbly indifferent (Slovic, 2007).  If we value all human life as equal, why does 
the world turn its shoulder when the masses suffer? Research has shown that this is due to 
individuals’ difficulty in brining meaning to abstractly represented large numbers 
(Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997). As Joseph Stalin put it, “The death of one Russian soldier is a 
tragedy. A million deaths is a statistic.” (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Similarly, research has found 
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that when thinking about large-scale numbers of suffering humans, people become more and 
more insensitive to increases in the scope of human suffering (Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997). 
Indeed, psychologists have identified a hyperbolic psychophysical function to the value placed 
on saving human lives, such that, “the importance of saving one life is great when it is the first, 
or only, life saved, but diminishes marginally as the total number of lives saved increases” 
(Slovic, 2007). One example of this scope insensitivity was a study performed by 
Fetherstonhaugh et al. (1997) in which individuals were less and less willing to donate money to 
save 1,500 lives in Rwandan refugee camps as the size of the camps’ at-risk population increased.  
This psychophysical function has been connected to “Weber’s law” which states that for 
a change to become just noticeable, a certain amount must be added to the stimulus, meaning that 
perceived difference is relative (Weber, 1834). In the realm of donation decisions, this suggests 
that instead of focusing simply on the number of lives saved, individuals consider that number in 
relation to the total number of those at risk, attempting to assess how much of a difference is 
being made through their contribution. For a small stimulus, only a small amount is necessary, 
however the larger the stimulus, the larger the amount necessary for an individual to perceive the 
difference (Weber, 1834; Fechner, 1860). This psychophysical function impacts a wide range of 
perceptual and cognitive entities such as heaviness, money, loudness and, as previously 
mentioned, the value one places on saving human lives (Slovic, 2007). Futhermore, “Weber’s 
Law” will benefit our understanding of how individuals perceive distance. 
Considering the impact of distance 
The key aim of this study involves better understanding how individuals perceive 
distance. Psychological distance is the subjective experience one has when they feel near or far 
from an event, location or person (Trope & Liberman, 2010; Williams, Huan, & Bargh, 2009; 
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Williams, Stein, & Galguera, in press). Construal-level theory (CLT) describes psychological 
distance as the manner in which individuals mentally represent information. CLT implies that, 
people are inclined to think about proximal events more concretely, and distant events more 
abstractly (Williams & Bargh, 2008; Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2003). For 
example, we feel psychologically closer to the town we grew up in, which we can recall very 
concretely, as compared to a foreign city, which we must describe more abstractly (Fujita et al., 
2006).  
Although different from objective measures of distance, psychological distance is rooted 
in our understandings of objective distance (Williams, Stein & Galguera, in press). In fact, 
research has suggested that psychological distance is, “likely a power function of objective 
distance (Stevens, 1975), with perceived psychological distance increasing sharply with initial 
increases in objective distance before increasing more gradually with subsequent increase in 
objective distance” (Van Boven et al. 2010). Here again we see the implications of “Weber’s 
Law.”   
Just as “Weber’s Law” has been found to influence future judgments, such as the value of 
human lives (Slovic, 2007), psychological distance has been found to influence downstream 
judgments and decisions as well. Research has found psychological distance impacts what 
individuals are motivated to do (Miller, 1944) as well as how they feel (Van Boven et al. 2010). 
More recent studies have aimed to examine the role of psychological distance in donation 
decisions. Williams, Stein & Galguera (in press) recruited passersby’s at a train station to 
participate, randomly assigning participants to distance condition. Participants were primed with 
either a sense of closeness or distance using a Cartesian plane manipulation, which requires 
individuals to plot two sets of coordinates on the plane (Williams and Bargh, 2008). After 
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completing a filler questionnaire, participants were asked to indicate how much of the two 
dollars they were to receive for participating in the study they would be willing to donate to a 
charitable organization. In 25-cent increments, participants could donate to Nothing But Nets, a 
charitable organization in Africa that provides mosquito nets to local populations to help stem 
the spread of malaria. Participants also completed an emotional empathy scale, which was found 
to be a significant predictor of the amount donated.  Additionally, the psychological distance 
manipulation had a direct effect on donation such that those who were primed with closeness 
donated significantly more money than those primed with distance. This finding provides an 
important glimpse into the psychology behind the lackluster support for international aid and 
merits further exploration (Williams, Stein & Galguera, in press).  
Overview of hypotheses 
This study seeks to build upon previous research in order to better understand how 
individuals’ perceptions of distance influence future judgments. We hypothesize that objective 
distance will be positively correlated with psychological distance, with increases in objective 
distance coinciding with increases in psychological distance. This finding would support notions 
that psychological distance is rooted in our understanding of physical distance. Additionally, we 
hypothesize that objective distance will be negatively correlated with participants’ perceptions of 
others’ moral obligation to natural disaster victims, such that increases in objective distance 
coincide with decreases in participants’ perceptions of others’ moral obligation to natural disaster 
victims. Similarly, we hypothesize that psychological distance will be negatively correlated with 
participants’ perceptions of others’ moral obligation to natural disaster victims, such that 
increases in psychological distance coincide with decreases in participants’ perceptions of others’ 
moral obligation to natural disaster victims. Overall, we hypothesize that variables will be more 
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strongly correlated at smaller distances than at greater distances. In this regard, we seek to 
examine not only how individuals perceive distance, but also how these perceptions can 
influence judgments such as moral obligation, a significant driver of donation decisions. 
Method 
 The study conducted consisted of a survey, presenting participants with two natural 
disasters, one in India, the other in the United States (U.S.), which occurred over the course of 
the spring and summer of 2013. These natural disasters served not only as a geographical 
reference point for future measures of objective and psychological distance, but also as the target 
for assistance in measuring moral obligation. Along with the natural disasters, participants were 
introduced to ten cities of increasing distance from each disaster site. The cities were used to 
measure objective and psychological distance from the natural disaster site, as well as to measure 
participants’ perceptions of others’ moral obligation to assist natural disaster victims.  Following 
the theoretical basis of “Weber’s Law” we hypothesize that variables will be more strongly 
correlated at smaller distances (i.e. in the U.S.) than at greater distances (i.e. in India). 
Participants 
 One hundred and eleven undergraduate students at the University of Colorado Boulder 
completed the survey through secure online software in exchange for course credit (Female=79, 
Mage=18.8, sdage=1.33).  Participants primarily self-identified as White/European American 
(African American=4, Asian=10, Hispanic/Latino=10, Mixed=7, Not from U.S.=4, Other=2).  
Research Design 
 The current study was a 2 (natural disaster location: India, U.S.) x 10 (cities of increasing 
distance) within-subjects design with repeating factors, where psychological distance was the 
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independent variable and perceived moral obligation rating was the dependent variable. Data will 
be analyzed by correlation and t-test.  
Measures  
 The survey was divided into two main blocks, one block per natural disaster location. In 
each block participants completed a geographical search task to familiarize themselves with the 
location of ten cities, which would be used again in later parts of the survey (Figures 1 & 2). In 
this regard, participants could gain a general sense of the location of the cities and thus not rely 
to heavily on the maps provided when making their judgments of psychological distance. Ten 
cities were selected so that participants could easily distinguish between what was ‘close’ to the 
natural disaster, and what was ‘far’ and ‘farther.’ This way, any variation in psychological 
distance and moral obligation ratings could be more pronounced. In addition to familiarizing 
participants with the geographical area surrounding the natural disaster, two informational 
paragraphs were provided to familiarize participants to the disaster itself. Real natural disasters 
were used to ensure a higher level of realism; the Yosemite Rim fire in the United States and the 
North India floods.  The type of information provided in the disaster descriptions were 
standardized so that in both cases participants learned the location, type, scale and cost of the 
natural disaster (included in Appendix A).   
Psychological distance was measured by first prompting participants with the following 
statements, “Places can seem close or far from one another, independent of how far away they 
actually are. For example, some places can seem “practically next door” to one another and 
others can seem like they are “millions of miles away” from each other. On the following pages, 
the map with each city will be provided for your reference, in case you do not remember the city. 
But if you have a sense of where the city is, try not to use the map.” This prompt was included to 
NUMBINGLY	  DISTANT	   	   11	  	  
ensure participants did not rely too heavily on the map provided when making their judgments. 
Psychological distance scores were obtained for each of the ten cities in both blocks (How close 
or far does [city] seem from the [natural disaster]?; 1=Seems Very Close, 9=Seems Very 
Distant).  
Objective distance was measured by first prompting participants with the following 
statements, “The previous questions asked you to think about how close or far away locations felt 
to the [natural disaster]. Now, you will be asked to estimate PHYSICAL DISTANCE. That is, 
you will be asked to estimate certain distances in miles. It will likely be helpful to use the map 
below each question to locate each city and assist you in estimating the number of miles.” For 
each of the ten target cities in the block, respondents were asked, “In miles, haw far do you think 
[city] is from the [natural disaster]?” (filled in).  
Two scores were obtained on perceived moral obligation. The first was derived from 
respondent’s own sense of moral obligation for helping victims of the disaster (How much do 
you feel it is your moral responsibility to help out with the [natural disaster]?; 0=Not at all, 
6=Extremely). The second was a generalized other moral obligation score, reflecting participants’ 
perceptions of how morally obligated citizens of the ten target cities should feel to assist the 
natural disaster (Now you will consider people in a variety of cities. How much do you feel it is 
their moral responsibility to help out with the [natural disaster]?; 0=Not at all, 6=Extremely).  
Concluding each block was a series of knowledge tasks, which were included to control 
for individuals’ pre-existing knowledge of the geographical areas and natural disaster.  The 
geographical knowledge component was comprised of two questions. First, participants were 
asked to name as many of the 15 most populous cities in the target country as possible in two 
minutes (one point for every correct answer). The mean scores on the city knowledge test were 
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MIndia=1.19, (sdIndia=1.53, rangeIndia 0-10), MU.S.=5.20, (sdU.S.=1.88, rangeU.S. 0-10). Second, 
participants were asked to name as many states within the target country as possible in the same 
two-minute time frame (one point for every correct answer with a total possible 50 points for the 
U.S. and 28 for India).  The means score on the state knowledge test were MIndia=0.36, 
(sdIndia=1.90, rangeIndia 0-15), MU.S.=23.37, (sdU.S.=7.52, rangeU.S. 3-50). Next, five multiple-
choice questions were included regarding the details of the natural disaster in order to determine 
how closely the participant had read. The mean score on the natural disaster knowledge test was 
MIndia=3.05 (sdIndia=.91, rangeIndia 0-4), MU.S.=3.07 (sdU.S.=1.28, rangeU.S. 0-5).  
 After completing both blocks, demographics were collected for participants’ age, sex and 
ethnicity. An additional question was added to control for exposure to the Boulder floods, which 
occurred one week into testing (To what extent were you personally affected by the recent floods 
in Colorado?; 0=Not at all, 6=Extremely). 87 participants answered this question, falling into the 
post-flood grouping, with a mean score of 2.67 (sd=1.9, range 0-6).  
Procedure 
 Participants completed the survey though a secure online software. After obtaining 
consent, the experimenter explained that the survey would examine participants’ judgments 
regarding natural disasters as well as their perceptions of other cities, states and countries.  
Participants were randomly assigned to either complete the India block, or U.S. block 
first, will all participants completing both blocks. Participants began with the geographical 
search task for their first set of ten cities. Next, they learned about the corresponding natural 
disaster, after which they reported perceptions of psychological distance from each of the ten 
cities to the natural disaster site. Following, participants reported what they believed to be the 
objective distance from each of the ten cities to the natural disaster site. Participants then 
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reported their perceptions of the moral obligations of citizens in each of the ten cities to assist the 
victims of the natural disaster. Participants finished the first natural disaster block by completing 
a series of knowledge tasks. The first tested for pre-existing knowledge of the geographic region, 
the second to assess their memory for the facts included in the description of the natural disaster. 
Participants then completed the same procedure for the second natural disaster. To close out the 
survey, participants were asked to report how closely they were impacted by the Colorado 
flooding, and fill in some demographic information regarding age, gender and ethnicity.  
Upon completion of the survey, participants were thanked for their time and awarded 
their course credit. There was no debriefing or check for suspicion in this survey. For more 
information on the means and standard deviations of our key variables, please see Table 1. 
Results 
In analyzing these data, a series of correlations were computed. First, correlations are 
computed separately for each individual. And for each individual, correlations are computed 
separately for each county. These correlations are: (psychological distance, objective distance), 
(objective distance, moral obligation), and (psychological distance, moral obligation). For each 
correlation, a Fisher r-to-z transformation was completed to normalize the distribution of 
correlations. Finally, inferential analyses were conducted based on these individual level 
correlations.  
We hypothesized that objective distance and psychological distance would be positively 
correlated, such that increases in objective distance would coincide with increases in 
psychological distance. Furthermore, we hypothesized that the correlation between objective 
distance and psychological distance would be especially strong for U.S. cities.  
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Correlations for objective distance and psychological distance were computed separately 
for each individual. In an effort to minimize the skew in responses, the natural log of objective 
distance responses were taken. Then for each individual, correlations were computed separately 
for each country. A Fischer r-to-z transformation was completed to normalize the distribution of 
correlations. A t-test found that the relationship between objective and psychological distance 
was significantly lower for the natural disaster in India (rIndia= .62, N=111), than for the natural 
disaster in the U.S. (rU.S.= .77, N=111), t(110)=2.17, p=.03. This finding supports the first 
hypothesis, that distance at a greater distance is less closely correlated than distance at a lesser 
distance. 
An independent-samples t test was conducted to determine whether participants 
perceived others’ moral obligation to help natural disaster victims as greater in the U.S. or 
greater in India. Participants reported significantly lower perceptions of others’ moral obligation 
to help victims in India (M=4.55, sd=0.94), than for the U.S. victims (M=4.38, sd=0.94), 
t(98)=2.27, p=0.025. 
It was hypothesized that objective distance and participants’ perceptions of others’ moral 
obligation to natural disaster victims would be negatively correlated, such that increases in 
objective distance would coincide with decreases in participants’ perceptions of others’ moral 
obligation to natural disaster victims. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that objective distance 
and participants’ perceptions of others’ moral obligation to natural disaster victims will be less 
closely correlated when participants consider the natural disaster in India than when considering 
the natural disaster in the United States. 
Correlations for objective distance and participants’ perceptions of others’ moral 
obligation to natural disaster victims were computed separately for each individual. In an effort 
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to minimize the skew in responses, the natural log of objective distance responses were taken. 
Then for each individual, correlations were computed separately for each country. A Fischer r-
to-z transformation was completed to normalize the distribution of correlations. A t-test found 
that the relationship between objective distance and participants’ perceptions of others’ moral 
obligation to natural disaster victims was significantly weaker for the natural disaster in India 
(rIndia= -0.49, N=98), as compared to the natural disaster in the U.S. (rU.S.= -0.67, N=107),  
t(97)=1.94, p=0.05. This finding supports our second set of hypotheses, that objective distance 
and participants’ perception of others’ moral obligation to natural disaster victims would be 
negatively correlated, with a weaker correlation for the natural disaster in India as compared to 
the U.S. natural disaster. 
It was hypothesized that psychological distance and participants’ perceptions of others’ 
moral obligation to natural disaster victims would be negatively correlated, such that increases in 
psychological distance would coincide with decreases in participants’ perceptions of others’ 
moral obligation to natural disaster victims. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that psychological 
distance and participants’ perceptions of others’ moral obligation to natural disaster victims will 
be less closely correlated when participants consider the natural disaster in India than when 
considering the natural disaster in the United States. 
Correlations for psychological distance and participants’ perceptions of others’ moral 
obligation to natural disaster victims were computed separately for each individual. Then for 
each individual, correlations were computed separately for each country. A Fischer r-to-z 
transformation was completed to normalize the distribution of correlations. A t-test found that 
the relationship between psychological distance and participants’ perceptions of others’ moral 
obligation to natural disaster victims was significantly weaker for the natural disaster in India 
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(rIndia= -0.47, N=99), as compared to the natural disaster in the U.S. (rU.S.= -0.68, N=107),  
t(98)=2.25, p=0.02. This finding supports our third set of hypotheses, that psychological distance 
and participants’ perception of others’ moral obligation to natural disaster victims would be 
negatively correlated, with a weaker correlation for the natural disaster in India as compared to 
the U.S. natural disaster. 
Overall, correlations were significantly higher for the U.S. natural disaster than the 
natural disaster in India. In addition to the previously discussed analyses, a t-test found that 
participants personal sense of moral obligation to the disaster victims significantly differed by 
disaster location, such that the sense of moral obligation was significantly weaker for the victims 
in India (M=2.14, sd=1.60), than for the U.S. victims (M=2.86, sd=1.63), t(109)=5.18, p<0.0001. 
This finding supports our final hypothesis, that when judging between ‘far’ and ‘farther’, 
participants’ judgments of variables (objective distance, psychological distance and participant’s 
perceptions of others’ moral obligation to natural disaster victims) at a greater distance will be 
less closely correlated than those at a lesser distance. 
Discussion 
We hypothesized and found that objective distance would be positively correlated with 
psychological distance, with increases in objective distance coinciding with increases in 
psychological distance. Additionally, we hypothesized and found that objective distance would 
be negatively correlated with participants’ perceptions of others’ moral obligation to natural 
disaster victims, such that increases in objective distance coincide with decreases in participants’ 
perceptions of others’ moral obligation to natural disaster victims. Similarly, we hypothesized 
and found that psychological distance would be negatively correlated with participants’ 
perceptions of others’ moral obligation to natural disaster victims, such that increases in 
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psychological distance coincide with decreases in participants’ perceptions of others’ moral 
obligation to natural disaster victims. Finally, across each of the correlations computed, 
(objective distance, psychological distance), (objective distance, moral obligation) and 
(psychological distance, moral obligation), we hypothesized and found that variables were more 
strongly correlated at smaller distances (i.e. within the U.S.) than at greater distances (i.e. within 
India).  
Overall, these data reflect an important role of distance on judgment and decision making. 
Our findings that the correlations between objective distance and moral obligation, as well as 
psychological distance and moral obligation are less strongly correlated at greater distances (i.e. 
within India; see Table 2) suggest that psychological distance may have an effect of numbing on 
pro-social judgments and decisions. Such a finding indicates the need for further research in 
order to better understand the extent of and capacity for psychological distance to numb 
individuals’ willingness to help those abroad.   
Limitations & Future Research  
 An important next step for this research would be to test this same survey on a sample of 
Indian citizens. In the current study, distance (U.S., India) is confounded with target (U.S., India). 
Indian participants would allow target and distance to be disconfounded. In such a sample, one 
would expect to see a reversal in the results, with weaker correlations between the variables for 
the United States than for India.  
Additionally, it would be interesting to see if there are any additional cultural differences 
that may play a role in explaining individuals judgments and decisions in this survey. 
Psychologists believe the concept of moral obligation is learned through the process of 
socialization, with close relationships to one’s parents and friends, as well as exposure to 
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religious teachings, playing an important role in its development (Kohlberg, 1981; Keller, 1996; 
Keller & Edelstein, 1993 Bond, 1996; Keller, et al., 2005). In this regard, it has been found that 
cultural differences can impact how individuals perceive moral obligation and its connection to 
helping behaviors. Research comparing Asian and Western cultures, has found that people from 
India perceived moral obligation to help individuals in need independent of role relationship or 
level of need (Baron & Miller, 2000; Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood 1990; Miller & Bersoff, 1992; 
Miller & Luthar, 1989; Keller, et al., 2005). On the other hand, Americans’ judgments vary, 
viewing helping behavior as morally obligated when the need is incredibly high (life-or-death), 
and when the victim is a close friend or family member (Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood 1990; 
Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Miller & Luthar, 1989). Furthermore, when Americans’ do consider 
helping outside of these parameters, they consider it more of a personal decision as opposed to a 
social duty (Baron & Miller, 2000; Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood 1990; Miller & Bersoff, 1992; 
Miller & Luthar, 1989).  
 With this in mind, a study comparing data collected in the United States to that of data 
collected from a sample in India may show significant differences. One could expect that while 
the differences between judgments of ‘far’ and ‘farther’ may still be present in the Indian sample, 
perceptions of moral obligation would likely be higher overall for the ‘farther’ disaster. 
Additional measures should be included to examine the motivation for helping behavior in the 
two samples. This would allow for a stronger understanding of how the cultural differences 
previously discussed may account for any differences in moral obligation scores. 
 Future research should also begin explore possible psychological manipulations in an 
attempt to discover what methods can make ‘far’ and ‘farther’ feel closer. This next step will be 
of critical importance to charitable organizations, as its findings will provide important 
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information as to how best solicit support for their aid efforts abroad.  If charitable organizations 
can utilize the manipulation properly, they should expect to see and increase in donations to their 
cause.  
 One manipulation for psychological distance that was previously discussed was that of 
the Cartesian plane (Williams and Bargh, 2008).  While this kind of task may be unrealistic for 
charitable organizations to implement, this manipulation is still of theoretical importance. 
Implementing such a manipulation in future research would allow us to better understand if and 
how natural disasters can be made to feel closer, and the resulting impact on variables such as 
moral obligation or even dollars donated. Should such a manipulation decrease psychological 
distance and increase variables such as moral obligation or contributions made, more practical 
manipulations of psychological distance could be studied. 
One such manipulation is the emotional manipulation implemented in the study by Van 
Boven, et al. (2010). In their study, participants were asked to describe the 2007 Virginia Tech 
shootings either emotionally or neutrally. It was found that those who described the tragedy 
emotionally perceived the event as less psychologically distant than those who described the 
tragedy neutrally (Van Boven, et al., 2010). Experimenting with various forms of this 
manipulation in the realm of donation decisions would provide charitable organizations with 
statistical backing as to the possible benefits of changing their fundraising strategies. This way, 
organizations could begin to implement more proven methods of solicitation, increasing their 
financial support, and thus improving their capacity to provide lifesaving goods and services to 
individuals and communities in need across the globe. 
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Conclusion 
Support was found for all of the hypotheses tested in this sample, finding that objective 
and psychological distance are positively correlated, that both psychological and objective 
distance are negatively correlated with perceptions of moral obligation, and that participants had 
a more difficult time judging the farther disaster location, resulting in lower correlations for India 
than the U.S. Finding support for the hypothesis that distance at a greater distance is less closely 
correlated than those at a lesser distance casts an important light onto how individuals’ perceive 
distance and how these perceptions influence other judgments. Moving forward with the 
suggestions provided will allow the field, as well as charitable organizations, to gain further 
insight into how individuals’ perceptions of distance impact important decisions. We hope that 
one day, the application of this and future findings will influence the manner in which charitable 
organizations solicit support for their efforts. 
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Table 1 
Means and standard deviations of measures. 
     India        United States 
    Mean    SD   Mean    SD 
Objective Distance   5.33  0.94    5.59  0.64 
Psychological Distance  4.24  0.81    3.84  0.75 
Moral Obligation   4.55  0.95    4.38  0.94 
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Table 2 
Correlations amongst variables by target country. 
            Moral Obligation India      Moral Obligation United States 
                                Pearson Correlation      N                  Pearson Correlation       N 
Objective Distance           -.49         98       -.67         107 
Psychological Distance     -.47         99       -.68          107 
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Figure 1. 
Map presented to participants of India. 
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Figure 2. 
Map presented to participants of the United States. 
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Appendix A: Informational paragraphs on natural disasters 
“The North India Floods were severe floods in Uttarakhand, a northern state in India. 
The floods started on June 14, 2013. The floods are the most deadly natural disaster in India 
since the 2004 tsunami, and 5,700 people have been “presumed dead” according to the 
Uttarakhand government. The floods were caused by heavy rainfall, which was about 375 
percent more than the benchmark rainfall during a normal monsoon. This caused the melting of 
the Chorabari Glacier and eruption of the Mandakini River which led to heaving floods and 
landslides.  
Entire villages and settlements such as Gaurikund and the market town of Ram Bada, a 
transition point to Kadarnath, have been obliterated, while the market town of Sonprayag 
suffered heavy damage and loss of lives. 95% of the casualties occurred in the state of 
Uttarakhand. The Army, Navy, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, and local administrations worked 
together for quick rescue operations. Charities and social organizations are also involved in the 
rescue and management of relief centers.”  
“The Yosemite Rim Fire is an ongoing wildfire in the central Sierra Nevada region, in 
Tuloumne and Mariposa counties of California in the U.S. The fired started on August 17, 2013. 
It is the third largest wildfire in California’s history, having burned 253,332 acres, and is the 
biggest wildfire ever in the Sierra Nevada. The fire was caused by a hunter’s illegal fire that went 
out of control. It grew to 100,000 acres after four days. The rapid spread is attributed to a record-
breaking drought and Forest Service budget cuts. 
The United States Forest Service made it their highest priority fire because it involved 
Yosemite National Park, and flames threatened the giant sequoias, some of the biggest and oldest 
organisms on Earth. The blaze has been difficult to fight because of inaccessible terrain and 
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erratic winds, forcing firefighters to be reactive instead of proactive. More than 5,000 firefighters 
have worked to contain the fire, and support has been provided through national park protection 
charities. “ 
 
 
 
